Three tests of US trade policy on intellectual property rights
by Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite
[ politics | opinion - july 03 ]
In 1959 Eleanor Roosevelt asked why the US had suffered a decline in its stature and prestige. [1] She dismissed explanations based on envy of US wealth and power as excuses. The real explanations she said lay in the way that the US had conducted its foreign policy. Amongst her criticisms of US foreign policy were that it was a "subtle form of isolationism" in which the purpose of US involvement was really to allow the US to go its own way, that it was too dominated by mercantile interests and economic expansionism, and it relied too much on military power and underestimated what could be "achieved through wise diplomacy". [2]
She went on to argue for three propositions, namely that the US should shed its subtle isolationism, work towards world goals that did not advantage it "at the expense of other nations and peoples" and that the goals it chose should be positive rather than negative. Despite their cold war context, Eleanor Roosevelt's three propositions constitute an interesting test of US foreign policy today. Here, however, we shall consider only their application to US trade policy on intellectual property rights.
At first glance, this may seem too narrow a segment of foreign policy to take, but this would be a mistaken perception. Property is a key institution, perhaps the key institution, of social and political morality. Western traditions of constitutionalism and the natural rights of persons have been deeply influenced by the desires and instincts of groups and individuals to protect their property holdings. The way that property rules are set has important implications for access by citizens to resources of all kinds and the exercise of individual liberty in a state.
The rules of intellectual property carry these kinds of implications because their objects are cultural and technical information, scientific knowledge and technologies. As millions of AIDS sufferers are discovering, obscure and complex patent rules are literally a matter of life and death, for they determine whether or not cheaper generic versions of AIDS drugs can be imported into their country or whether a generic manufacturer can in fact make the drug in the first place. Intellectual property affects much more than access to pharmaceuticals. Trademarks are fundamental to marketing strategies that affect the hopes and emotions of consumers and copyright has long affected the structure of international publishing, the costs of education and more recently industries like computer software (copyright was one of the principal means by which Microsoft achieved its position of dominance).
Beginning in the mid-1980s, a sea change took place in the way that international standards of intellectual property were set. As we shall see in the first part of the paper a small group of key players in the US had a big idea - to link intellectual property to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). When more than a hundred trade ministers gathered in the splendid Salle Royale of the Palais des Congrès in Marrakesh on 15 April 1994 to sign the Final Act of the Uruguay trade round negotiations, one of the agreements in that Final Act that was obligatory on all members of the future World Trade Organization (WTO) was the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Many developing countries had agreed to TRIPS in the hope that the US would be content with its standards and the gains it brought to the US economy. It was a naive hope and it turned out be one in vain. TRIPS, as we will see, has turned out to be a floor without a ceiling.
The corporate actors responsible for TRIPS at the end of the 20th century laid down the foundations for the globalization of a protectionist intellectual property paradigm for the knowledge economies of the 21st century. In the second part of this paper we ask whether the US in creating this paradigm for the world has met the three tests laid down by Eleanor Roosevelt. We conclude it does not.
The story of TRIPS
(i) Private networked governance
Susan Sell in her study of TRIPS points out that some twelve US corporations were primarily responsible for the lobbying that brought TRIPS into being. [3] We have come to a similar conclusion. [4] TRIPS, however, was not a case of simple lobbying because it required the drafting of a detailed international agreement containing US standards of intellectual property protection. That draft then had to be steered through a multilateral trade negotiation involving more than one hundred states and that lasted from 1986 to 1993. The key to explaining how this was achieved lies in a small number of corporations creating ever widening circles of influence that brought more actors and networks into the cause of global intellectual property rights. The activities of Pfizer Corporation during this time illustrate how TRIPS came to be an output of a sophisticated form of private networked governance.
Pfizer more than most pharmaceutical corporations had invested in developing countries and so saw the threat to international markets that generic manufacturers in countries like India posed for the R&D pharmaceutical industry. It also saw that a new approach to the international patent regime was needed because increasingly developing countries were using their superior numbers in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to put forward initiatives that favoured their own position as net importers of foreign technology. During the early 1980s a small group of Washington-based policy entrepreneurs had conceived of the idea of linking the intellectual property regime to the trade regime. Pfizer executives, including its CEO Edmund Pratt, were amongst the leading proponents of this idea. Essentially their notion was to get an agreement on intellectual property into the GATT. It was a radical idea. States had moved cautiously in ceding sovereignty over intellectual property rights within the context of WIPO.
Pfizer executives began to use their networks in two important ways. The first consisted of network activation. Pfizer executives started to disseminate the idea of a trade-based approach to intellectual property. Pratt began delivering speeches at business fora like the National Foreign Trade Council and the Business Round Table outlining the links between trade, intellectual property and investment. As a CEO of a major US company, he could work the trade association scene at the highest levels. Other Pfizer senior executives also began to push the intellectual property issue within national and international trade associations. Gerald Laubach, President of Pfizer Inc., was on the board of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and on the Council on Competitiveness set up by President Ronald Reagan; Lou Clemente, Pfizer's General Counsel, headed up the Intellectual Property Committee of the US Council for International Business; Bob Neimeth, Pfizer International's President was the Chair of the US side of the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD. The message about intellectual property went out along the business networks to chambers of commerce, business councils, business committees, trade associations, and peak business bodies. Progressively Pfizer executives who occupied key positions in strategic business organizations were able to enrol the support of these organizations for a trade-based approach to intellectual property. With every such enrolment the business power behind the case for such an approach became harder and harder for governments to resist.
The second way in which Pfizer operated was by tying various networks together to obtain action. One of the nodes in the network that played a pivotal role in the negotiations over intellectual property was the Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiations (ACTN). ACTN had been created in 1974 by Congress under US trade law as part of a private sector advisory committee system. The purpose of this system was to ensure a concordance between official US trade objectives and US commerce. ACTN existed at the apex of this system. Pratt, with the assistance of other senior executives within Pfizer, began to put himself forward within business circles as someone who could develop US business thinking about trade and economic policy. In 1979 Pratt became a member of ACTN and in 1981 its Chairman. During the 1980s representatives from the most senior levels of big business within the US were appointed by the President to serve on the committee (Pratt was appointed by President Carter). The Committee was a purely advisory one, but with direct access to the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the duty of advising him/her on US trade policy and negotiating objectives in the light of national interest, it was an extremely influential committee. Out of this business crucible came the crucial strategic thinking on the trade-based approach to intellectual property. Aside from Pratt, the CEOs of IBM and Du Pont also served on ACTN. With Pratt at the helm, ACTN began to develop a sweeping trade and investment agenda. A Task Force on Intellectual Property was established within ACTN. John Opel, the then Chairman of IBM and another key member of ACTN, headed this Task Force. During Pratt's six years of chairmanship ACTN worked closely with William E Brock III, the USTR from 1981-1985 and Clayton K Yeutter the USTR from 1985-1989 helping to shape the services, investment and IP (intellectual property) trade agenda of the US.
ACTN's basic message to US government was that it should pull every lever at its disposal in order to obtain the right result for US on intellectual property. There were a lot of possible levers. US Executive Directors to the IMF and World Bank could ask about intellectual property when casting their votes on loans and access to bank facilities; US aid and development agencies could use their funds to help spread the IP gospel. Over time the message was heard and acted upon. Provisions protecting intellectual property as an investment activity were automatically included in the Bilateral Investment Treaty program that the US was engaged in with developing countries in the 1980s. Means of influence of a personal and powerful kind also began to operate. Shultz, the Secretary of State discussed the IP issue with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew stated Jacques Gorlin in his 1985 analysis of the trade-based approach to IP. [5] President Reagan in his message to Congress of 6 February 1986 entitled 'America's Agenda for the Future' proposed that a key item was much greater protection for US intellectual property abroad. [6] The ground was being prepared for intellectual property to become the stuff of big picture political dealing and not just technical trade negotiation.
Both Opel and Pratt had been pushing the IP agenda with the USTR, at first with William Brock and then his successor Clayton Yeutter. In 1981 Brock had formed the Quadrilateral Group (Quad) of countries for the purpose of trying to develop a consensus for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations. In the early 1980s there were differences of view between Europe and the US on the desirability and content of a future trade round. Without the agreement of the US and Europe the prospects of a multilateral trade round getting off the ground were slim. The Quad consisted of the US, the European Community, Japan and Canada. Once these countries had achieved a consensus on an agenda for a multilateral trade round, the round would most likely begin. Yeutter saw the centrality of intellectual property to a new trade round, but the problem was, as he explained to Pratt and Opel, that when he went to meetings of the Quad there was no real support from the other Quad members to merge IP and trade.
The problem facing Pratt and Opel was clear enough. They had to convince business organisations in Quad countries to pressure their governments to include intellectual property in the next round of trade negotiations. That meant first convincing European and Japanese business that it was in their interests for intellectual property to become a priority issue in the next trade round.
Pratt and Opel's response was swift. In March of 1986 they created the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC). [7] The IPC was an ad hoc coalition of 13 major US corporations; Bristol-Myers, DuPont, FMC Corporation, General Electric, General Motors, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Monsanto, Pfizer, Rockwell International and Warner Communications. It described itself as "dedicated to the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement on intellectual property in the current GATT round of multilateral trade negotiations."
Europe was the key target for the IPC. Once Europe was on board Japan was likely to follow, or at least not to raise significant opposition. Canada, despite its Quad membership, was not really a player. It was the support of European and Japanese corporations that was crucial. What followed was a consensus-building exercise carried out at the highest levels of senior corporate management. CEOs of US companies belonging to the IPC would contact their counterparts in Europe and Japan and urge them to put pressure on their governments to support the inclusion of intellectual property in the next trade round. Small but very senior and powerful business networks were activated. The IPC also sent delegations to Europe in June 1986 and Japan in August of 1986 to persuade business in those countries that they also had an interest in seeing the GATT become a vehicle of globally enforceable intellectual property rights. The IPC's efforts in the lead-up to a crucial ministerial meeting at Punte del Este in 1986 brought it success, for both European and Japanese industry responded by putting pressure on their governments to put intellectual property on the trade agenda. At Punta del Este the US got the mandate it wanted to negotiate an agreement on intellectual property.
Public economic coercion
TRIPS was not, however, just the product of private governance based on a strategy of tying influential networks together. It was also the product of economic coercion. When the US began to push for the inclusion of intellectual property at the beginning of the 1980s, developing countries resisted the proposal. Developing countries, which at that time held about one per cent of the world's patents, and were desperate for access to western technology, knew that such a proposal would not be in their interests.
The countries that were the most active in their opposition to the US agenda were India, Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Egypt, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Yugoslavia. [8] Breaking the resistance of these 'hard liners' was fundamental to achieving the outcome that the US wanted. Many developing countries were dependent upon access to the US market. This dependence had in fact been created under a system devised by UNCTAD and known as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). In 1984 the US began a process of reforming its GSP system and its Trade Act essentially to create a national trade enforcement tool on behalf of its corporations. Under US trade law, US corporations could petition the USTR to withdraw benefits of trade agreements or impose duties on goods from foreign countries that were not extending adequate and effective protection for US intellectual property. The USTR then had the option of listing countries under what came to be known as the '301' process. Table 1 below shows how systematically the US used its trade enforcement tool to break the resistance of key developing countries. As the table shows almost every developing country that opposed the US at the GATT ended up being listed for bilateral attention by the US. There was nothing very secret about this process. In 1988 the US changed its Trade Act to make resisting the US in a multilateral forum part of the conditions that could lead to a country being identified as a Priority Foreign Country and therefore the subject of a Special 301 investigation. [9] There could be no clearer articulation of a threat than to enact it as law.
Table 1: US trade action against key developing countries in the GATT between 1984-1993
|
Developing Country members of the hardliners opposing IP in the GATT or active in the 10 plus 10 TRIPS negotiating Group or both. [10] |
Years between 1984-1993 in which a developing country was the subject of a petition, listed, investigated or had penalties imposed under US 301 or GSP programme. |
|
Argentina |
1988-1993 |
|
Brazil |
1985, 1987-1993 (1988*) |
|
Chile |
1988-1993 |
|
Colombia |
1989-1993 |
|
Cuba |
|
|
Egypt |
1989-1993 |
|
Hong Kong |
** |
|
India |
1989-1993 (1992*) |
|
Indonesia |
1989, 1990 |
|
Malaysia |
1989, 1990 1993 |
|
Mexico |
1987*,1989 |
|
Nicaragua |
|
|
Nigeria |
|
|
Peru |
1992,1993 |
|
Singapore |
** |
|
South Korea |
1985,1989, 1992, 1993** |
|
Tanzania |
|
|
Thailand |
1989*-1993 |
|
Uruguay |
|
|
Venezuela |
1989-1993 |
|
Yugoslavia |
1989-1991 |
* Year in which penalties were actually imposed.
** Countries that were given favourable GSP packages because they had improved their intellectual property protection.
Developing countries hoped that by negotiating multilaterally there was the possibility that they would be able to obtain some limits on the use of 301 actions by the US on intellectual property. This, at any rate, was what they were being told by developed country negotiators and the GATT Secretariat. Exactly the opposite happened. During the 1990s the US increased its unilateral surveillance of countries on intellectual property issues. In her 2000 Special 301 Report the then USTR Charlene Barshefsky pointed out that more than 70 countries had been reviewed under Special 301. She named 59 foreign countries that failed to meet satisfactory standards of intellectual property; 59 countries that had been graded and listed; 59 countries whose laws and practices on intellectual property had to be watched, analysed and acted upon.
During the 1980s and 1990s the US created, in effect, a global regulatory ratchet for intellectual property. This ratchet consists of waves of bilateral agreements (beginning in the 1980s) followed by occasional multilateral or regional standard-setting (e.g. TRIPS and NAFTA). Each wave of bilateral or multilateral treaties never derogates from existing standards and very often sets new ones. In all these agreements states are bound not to offer less protection than agreed to, but are allowed to offer more extensive protection than is required under the relevant agreement. Thus the ratchet only ever moves upwards. Its latest manifestation is the free trade agreements that the US has concluded with Jordan, Chile and Singapore. These all contain long and detailed provisions on intellectual property, provisions that are 'TRIPS-plus'.
Eleanor Roosevelt's three tests
Eleanor Roosevelt's first test was that the US "should shed the remnants of its isolationism and direct itself to achieving world goals". The isolationism she was complaining about was not of the simple Fortress America kind, but rather one in which the US sets about fashioning a world in which its sovereignty remains intact and it can more or less pursue the ends it chooses. The global protectionist paradigm of intellectual property the US is constructing is an example of the blind expansionist isolationism that Eleanor Roosevelt warned about. The standards of intellectual property that the US is globalizing are its domestic standards, standards that meet its own economic needs and fit with its cultural and philosophical traditions. Strong patent standards may make sense in the US because, amongst other things, it has 3,676 scientists and engineers in R&D per million people, but surely they make no sense in a country like Rwanda that has only 35 per million. Around the world many people have deeply held reservations about the patentability of plants, animals and human genetic resources, reservations that are based on a variety of ethical perspectives and traditions, including religious, indigenous and environmental ones. Yet the US has relentlessly pushed in TRIPS and subsequent bilateral agreements what the US Supreme Court has declared to be its domestic position, namely that anything under the sun is patentable. [11] It is equally relentless in seeking to impose upon the world a system of agriculture that is really a system of technology in which the farmer becomes the lessee of patented seeds, plants, fertilizers and pesticides. Fears that this technology does not meet the needs of subsistence farmers around the world, that it carries with it environmental risks that have not been properly assessed, that it cuts across farmer traditions such as the saving and exchange of seed or that it requires economies of scale that few countries can really exploit are brushed aside by its US multinational overseers who respond by threatening litigation in the WTO.
Ignoring moral diversity in the definition of intellectual property rules while seeking through those rules to universalize its own cultural perceptions is a US practice to be found in other parts of intellectual property. The US was successful in excluding from TRIPS the recognition of authors' rights, those rights that are based on European philosophical traditions that recognize an indissoluble link between creators and their works (the key ones being the right to paternity and the right to integrity). Hollywood in the form of the Motion Picture Association Of America (MPA) has been opposed to these rights because they are potential interferences in its world-wide systems of production, marketing, distribution and exhibition. The right of integrity, for example, gives authors, potentially at least, some rights over how their works might be used in a film. Directors may also use the right to exercise some control over the commercial fate of their films (for example, preventing the colourisation of a film shot in black and white).
Yet at the same time actors like the MPA invoke free speech values to argue that there should be no restrictions on the circulation of US film, television and other copyright works. Of course, there is a trade agenda because as has been known for a long time trade follows the film. The practical upshot of these free speech/free trade arguments is a constant pressure to remove quotas. No quota is too low to be ignored. When Indonesia imposed a screen quota requiring its First Run theatres to show at least two Indonesian films each month for a minimum of two days both the MPA and the International Intellectual Property Alliance raised the matter with the USTR as part of their recommendation in 1993 to list Indonesia under the 301 process. The endgame for Hollywood is no restriction on its capacity to dominate any type of screen in the world at any time and place.
The US fails the first test because it fashions and globalizes intellectual property standards based on its own economic institutions, that do not threaten its sovereignty, that ignore the world's moral diversity and the desire of different societies to pursue different paths to development. Eleanor Roosevelt's second test was that the US should choose goals that did not advantage it "at the expense of other nations and peoples". The US failure to meet this second test has been monumental and for reasons of space we confine ourselves to some obvious examples.
To begin with we need to note that as measured by indicators such as number of scientific publications, number of students in higher education, number of scientists, the US has a greater volume of knowledge located within it than any other country on earth. [12] For some time now the US has had a historically unprecedented opportunity to use this stock of knowledge to further the development of the many poor states in the world. Since knowledge has the quality of being non-rivalrous in consumption, it follows that the US would not itself lose the knowledge it utilized for development purposes (and in fact would probably add to it since the application of knowledge generally leads to more knowledge). Moreover, treating knowledge as part of a global intellectual commons would not be inconsistent with the US pursuing its own economic growth. The principle of the intellectual commons is not, as the free software movement has shown, inconsistent with the development of business models. In short, the US could use its stock of knowledge in ways that were consistent with both economic efficiency and global developmental justice. By imposing a global protectionist intellectual property paradigm on the world it has chosen to do precisely the reverse. For example, by imposing its own standards of intellectual property on developing country economies it has changed the terms of trade of those economies. Developing states, which are net importers of intellectual property, will have to make greater payments to the US for the use of intellectual property rights than otherwise would have been the case. A study by the World Bank, for example, pointed out that the net rent transfers to the US from the patent provisions of TRIPS would be about $19 billion per year. [13] Through the strategem of a redefinition of intellectual property rules, the rich in the US have found new ways to rob the world's poor. For the richest, most powerful nation that is blessed with knowledge assets that could make so much difference to poverty to conduct itself in this way is simply morally unconscionable. It squares with no theory of justice except the one that Thrasymachus gives to Socrates in Plato's Republic - "I define justice or right as what is in the interest of the stronger party".
The ruthless mercantilist accumulation and control of knowledge assets by the US comes at the expense of the basic human rights that Eleanor Roosevelt helped to fight for and win in the United Nations. A clear example of this has been the way in which the US position on patented AIDS medicines in the WTO has been driven by its desire to further entrench the market power of its pharmaceutical multinationals. The debates over the AIDS, patents, TRIPS and the right to health are complex, but lying at the heart of the problem is a simple structural reality. Developing countries that are members of the WTO have to recognize patents on pharmaceutical products. The only reason that the price of patented anti-retroviral therapies have come down from US$15,000 per year to less than US$300 per year is because a few generic manufacturers like the Indian company Cipla were able to make the drugs at a price closer to marginal cost. They were able to manufacture because of their domestic patent position. However, all those developing countries with serious generic manufacturing capabilities (approximately nine developing countries including India, China, Brazil and Thailand) either do or will soon have to recognize pharmaceutical patents as part of their TRIPS obligations. This will have two basic effects, one short term and the other longer term. In the short term, the capacity of these countries to export to other developing countries will slowly dry up. In the longer term, the generic industries of the main developing country exporters will become integrated into the manufacturing and distribution strategies of US and European pharmaceutical multinationals. The effect will be to drive prices up, not down.
The WTO has been trying, without success, to address the problem of exports of AIDS drugs. Its failure to obtain a solution to the problem has been widely reported. What has not been reported has been the way in which the US and Europe have used the opportunity to further advantage their pharmaceutical industries. Under a proposed draft text to amend TRIPS, developing country generic manufacturers would have been given no certainty over their long-term ability to export to other developing countries making further investment on their part risky and making economies of scale difficult to achieve.
The failure of the WTO to develop anything like an adequate solution to the AIDS issue is emblematic of a broader truth about global intellectual property rights and the developing world. Western leaders like Bush and Blair mouth the language of equality and developmental justice. Their rhetoric, however, is not matched by deeds. Instead their negotiators walk into trade negotiations the captives of the intellectual property-based industries that, like the US pharmaceutical industry, contribute millions to re-election campaigns. Those trade negotiators listen to the whispers of power and inflict further losses on the developing world.
Here we arrive at Eleanor Roosevelt's third test; the US should choose positive rather than negative goals. Her concern was that the US was spending too much of its time during the Cold War period pursuing the negative goal of containing communism while not advancing a more positive vision. "People", she wrote, "live by affirmations, not negations". [14] This third test also has a resonance in the case of the trade policy and intellectual property. The US has globalized intellectual property rights using the rhetoric of containment. Developing countries have been stigmatized as 'pirate' countries for copying technology, even though often they were not in breach international conventions by doing so and even though learning through copying was itself a part of US industrial development in the 19th and first part of the 20th centuries.
At a deeper level the global intellectual property paradigm is a negative vision. The basis of competition lies in the development of skills. The acquisition of skills by newcomers disturbs roles and hierarchies. After India built a national drug industry it began exporting bulk drugs and formulations to places such as Canada. A developing country that had acquired skills threatened those at the top of an international hierarchy of pharmaceutical production - the US, Japan, Germany and the UK. Underneath the individualist ideology of intellectual property there lies an agenda of under-development, of maintaining an economic hierarchy in the world. Today's global intellectual property paradigm is all about protecting the knowledge and skills of the leaders of the pack.
Conclusion
The protectionist intellectual property paradigm that the US has quietly globalized over the last 20 years or so has attracted little comment outside of specialist circles. The insiders who have lobbied and worked for this paradigm understand the new realities of information economies and where wealth comes from. The inequalities and problems of this global redistribution of property rights in information are slowly coming to be understood. But for the time being the US state and US multinationals remained committed partners in the institutional project of information feudalism, that is the project of acquiring and maintaining global power based on the ownership of knowledge assets. This project fails the three tests of a good foreign policy that Eleanor Roosevelt proposed for the US to assist in a process of peaceful development that in the long run would also spread market opportunities for the US. And it is a long way from her hope that the US would work towards a "world of autonomous, prospering democracies"[original emphasis]. [15] She would be disappointed, but perhaps not surprised.
Notes
1 See Eleanor Roosevelt, 'What Are We For?' in Allida M Black, (ed.) Courage in a Dangerous World: The Political Writings of Eleanor Roosevelt, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999, 213-221. [Back]
2 See Eleanor Roosevelt, 'What Are We For?' in Allida M Black, (ed.) Courage in a Dangerous World: The Political Writings of Eleanor Roosevelt, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999, 213-221, 215, 217. [Back]
3 Susan Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003. [Back]
4 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?, Earthscan, London, 2002. [Back]
5 Jacques Gorlin, 'A Trade-Based Approach for the International Copyright Protection for Computer Software' September 1, 1985, 47, fn 47. [Back]
6 See BNA's Patent, Trademark & Copyright Journal, 31, February 13 1986, 285. [Back]
7 See Edmund Pratt, 'Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade', speech to US Council for International Business, available at http://www.pfizer.com/pfizerinc/policy/forum. [Back]
8 JA Bradley, 'Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade in Services in the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations', 23 (1987) Stanford Journal of International Law, 57, 81. [Back]
9 See 19 USC 2242(b)(1)(C). [Back]
10 The developing country members that were active in the 10 + 10 Group during the TRIPS negotiations were identified with the kind assistance of Adrian Otten of the World Trade Organisation. The countries active in this group were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand. [Back]
11 Diamond v Chakrabarty 206 USPQ 193, 200 (1980). [Back]
12 Thomas Schott, 'Global Webs of Knowledge', American Behavioural Scientist, 44 (2001), 1740-1751. [Back]
13 See Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, World Bank, Washington DC, 2002, 137. [Back]
14 See Eleanor Roosevelt, 'What Are We For?' in Allida M Black, (ed.) Courage in a Dangerous World: The Political Writings of Eleanor Roosevelt, Columbia University Press, New York, 213-221, 216. [Back]
15 See Eleanor Roosevelt, 'What Are We For?' in Allida M Black, (ed.) Courage in a Dangerous World: The Political Writings of Eleanor Roosevelt, Columbia University Press, New York, 213-221, 218. [Back]
