Reflections on the September 11 attacks and "pre-emptive" war in Iraq
by Hall Gardner
[ politics | opinion - september 04 ]
Part one
The 11 September 2001 attacks by pan-Islamic militants on the World Trade Center and Pentagon has raised an acrimonious debate within the US as to who was responsible for letting such attacks take place and how best to deter and prevent such acts from taking place in the future. The debate became even more acrimonious following the Bush administration's decision to opt for "pre-emptive" (really preclusive) war with Iraq in March 2003. In effect, the Bush administration was able to take advantage of the attacks on September 11 to expand the "war on terrorism" to a war on "rogue states" - without any clear end to either conflict in sight.
In regard to September 11, the domestic debate within the US has been quite rancorous, but there has been no smoking gun to prove that the Bush administration had hard evidence of an imminent attack. Certainly, as Richard A Clarke has argued in Against All Enemies, there were clues which could and should have been more thoroughly investigated. Certainly, the FBI and CIA could have done a better job in communicating with one another.
There will be those who will continue to argue that the 11 September catastrophe was much like Pearl Harbor in that Washington probably had more evidence of Japanese plans to attack than it is willing to reveal. Conspiracy theories about September 11 abound, yet the Pearl Harbor analogy raises even more portentous concerns for the future of this conflict: that has now re-awakened the "Sleeping Giant."
First, there is the political manipulation of the September 11 attacks, as illustrated in the Bush administration's attempt to link Al-Qaida with Iraqi support for terrorist activities. Although Saddam Hussein's intelligence services and Al-Qaida may have had some tenuous contacts, it appears highly dubious that Saddam had infiltrated the organization or coordinated planning in any way with Bin Laden's group. The Bush administration thus began to direct public attention toward the Iraqi question, in the effort to press for "regime change", an option that had been considered, but ruled out, by the administration of George Bush, Sr. in 1991. Over time, the Iraqi threat began to take precedence over efforts to track down and eliminate Al-Qaeda before September 11, in regard to the significant amount of the military resources used to pressure the Iraqi regime.
Even after the October 2001 intervention in Afghanistan, in the not entirely successful effort to eliminate the Taliban and Al-Qaida, the Bush administration continued to focus almost obsessively on Iraq, in the belief that Saddam Hussein would eventually seek revenge for his defeat in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War. It was argued that even if Saddam Hussein did not possess nuclear weapons or other WMD at present, he would ultimately possess such capabilities.
The so-called "neo-conservatives" (who are not at all conservative) within the Bush Jr administration, who are primarily linked to the Defense Department, argued that the Clinton policy of "containment" (which consisted of frequent US-UK bombing of Iraqi military facilities since 1998) had failed. They believed that direct military intervention represented the only option, not only to eliminate the actual, if not potential, threat posed by WMD, but also to press for "regime change."
It was argued that US military intervention, followed by "regime change," would then start a process of "democratization" throughout the entire Middle East/Persian Gulf region (whatever that meant for Arab monarchies, authoritarian governments, and the Islamic Republic of Iran). Here, the Bush administration accordingly waged a propaganda campaign to convince American and world opinion that Iraq possessed considerable WMD capabilities, when the truth of the matter was that Saddam's brutal military machine had been not-so-gradually crumbling, at least since the 1998 Clinton bombing campaign.
The contentiously utopian and illusory prospect of the "democratization" of the entire Middle East/ Persian Gulf area, however, was coupled with not-so-veiled threats of potential US military intervention directed at those states in the general region and the world that supported "terrorism" or that intended to develop WMD. In effect, if the US does ultimately make good on its threats, or if regimes fail to "democratize" in ways that Washington approves, it may mean future US military interventions.
Concurrently, it is likewise possible that other states may take up the banner of "preemption." After the US intervention in Iraq, for example, India - which is presently engaged in peace talks with Pakistan - had threatened to engage in preemptive strikes if Islamabad did not stop its support for terrorism. Israel has recently (September 2004) threatened to intervene in Syria or Iran, much as it previously threatened to intervene in Iraq if the US did not act to stop the development of Iraqi WMD. After the September 2004 seizure of hostages in Northern Ossetia, the Russian military chief of staff threatened to "take preventive strikes against terrorist bases... in any region."
Here, the analogy to Pearl Harbor possesses even more ominous ramifications: It is quite possible that, as the wars on "terrorism" and on "rogue states" continue to drag on with no clear "victory' in sight, that one side or another might ultimately opt to utilize some form of weapon of mass destruction, including nuclear "terror" - as the US itself did in revenge for Pearl Harbor.
Contrary to its intent, US military intervention in Iraq seems to have further convinced the other "axis of evil" states, North Korea and Iran, that the possession of nuclear weapons, or other forms of WMD, could serve as a deterrent against a potential US attack, or else a deterrent against a potential attack by one of their regional enemies. It is also possible that such preemptive strikes could drag major powers into conflict with one another, if such actions are not well coordinated through a multilateral concert.
Part two
At the time of the Korean War, George Kennan, in American Diplomacy (1953), compared the US with a "prehistoric monster." Kennan essentially argued that the Washington could have at least "taken a little more interest in what was going on at earlier date" and "prevented some of these situations from arising instead of proceeding from an undiscriminating indifference to a holy wrath equally undiscriminating."
The problem thus lies in foreseeing how specific disputes could escalate over time, and how to prevent a major overreaction if the conflict does begin to escalate. One can add to Kennan's point that once the US does act in "a holy wrath equally undiscriminating," Washington seems incapable of comprehending that it will still be confronted with ongoing political-social-economic and ethical dilemmas - not to overlook long term peacekeeping - even when "victory", and an "end of the fighting", has been declared. Many of these latter issues and problems stem precisely from the fact that Washington did not thoroughly address the roots of the dispute before or after the conflict, and because Washington did not initially work in true concert with regional states and other significant powers to help find a diplomatic resolution...
Kennan's observation appears particularly pertinent when one regards how the US supported what President Reagan once called "freedom fighters" and - even more preposterously - the "moral equivalent of the founding fathers" in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Once Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev opted for unilateral withdrawal, US engagement ceased. There were no efforts made to forge a political settlement in the process of Soviet withdrawal.
Moscow had very clearly warned Washington that continued support for the Afghan mujaheddin could well backfire against US interests. Congress itself was well aware of the possibility: The Congressional debate on whether to sell Stinger shoulder-held missiles to assist the Afghan "freedom fighters" fight Soviet gunship helicopters had raised the question as to whether these weapons might ultimately be used against American and European interests. The US Congress opted to provide Stinger weaponry, which helped achieve victory for the Afghan resistance, at the price of putting such weapons in the hands of pan-Islamic extremists. But once the Soviet Union finally withdrew, the United States abruptly withdrew all support for the country itself, leading Afghanistan to fester in limbo. By 1993, the Taliban had taken over, joined and assisted by Al-Qaeda; it was believed that this new group, with its xenophobic character, would bring "order" and "stability"... Washington simply washed its hands of the matter, departing from the country in "undiscriminating indifference" in George Kennan's words.
After the defeat of the Taliban in December 2001, the US at least attempted to work with each of the domestic Afghan factions, and with all the regional powers, including Russia, in attempting to reconstruct the country. Yet the Americans have begun to realize much of what the British realized in the late 19th century: Given the highly fractious nature of Afghan politics, a long-term settlement will prove extremely difficult to achieve. Although some progress has been made, successes have been minimal.
Bringing peace and development to the entire country will prove to be a long-term venture, primarily because aid and investment will not be forthcoming without strong commitment to political and military security. NATO peacekeepers, which have been under political pressure to move into the countryside, have had major difficulties in controlling Kabul alone. At the same time, the fact that opium production has skyrocketed some 8 to 10 times after the US-led intervention in 2001 has raised questions as to whether international assistance is simply sinking into a black hole, and precisely where opium profits are going....
Part three
The catch phrase "war on terrorism" represents the perfect formula for perpetual conflict. The term provides no direction and provides no foreseeable resolution, particularly as it has now been confounded with the war on "rogue states." Terrorism is primarily a psychological tool, used by state and anti-state actors, which is generally intended to achieve specific political goals, cause fear and panic, or to demonstrate an iron will to use violence - even if that means martyrdom - and mass murder.
It seems to have been so quickly forgotten that the Cold War had often been characterized as a "balance of terror" in that both the US and USSR manipulated their own brands of nuclear "terrorism" as the ultimate threat to obtain geopolitical concessions. In the post-Cold war era, we have consequently moved from a "balance" to an "imbalance" of "terror." This shift in the nature of international relations has impelled significant changes in American global strategy, as the latter attempts to cope with the threat posed by "asymmetrical warfare."
The issue raised here it that there will be no end to this conflict as long as both established governments and anti-state actors continue to counter-accuse each other of engaging in acts of anti-state "terrorism" or "state supported terrorism." Even more problematic will be deciding which groups might be fighting for "legitimate" causes against real state repression, and which groups represent "terrorists" but without a "just" cause.
The fact that the Americans see themselves in a "war" and that the Europeans see themselves in a "fight" indicates a significant difference in how to define the "enemy" and precisely which strategy and tactics to utilize. The Russians, for example, have denounced American calls to work toward a political solution for the crisis in Chechnya and the Caucasus. The difference in perspectives illustrates the tremendous difficulty in achieving a truly multilateral and concerted approach to the crisis.
Not only is the term "war on terrorism" dangerously misleading, but the American tendency to demonize its opponents oversimplifies issues by focusing on individual leaders rather than examining the more complex sources of conflict. The domestically oriented politics of media demonization tend to foreclose the very possibility of working out possible compromises as negotiated deals would tend to legitimize the power of the very state leadership or "terrorist" organization that has repeatedly been denounced as the epitome of "evil." While a leader may publicly claim that it is absolutely impossible to deal with "terrorists," secret diplomacy may prove necessary to break the deadlock. The question remains: Which groups to "appease" - and which not?
The Bush administration's tendency to demonize Saddam Hussein made a diplomatic solution close to impossible, and made war more likely. If it is not fully understood why the regime acts the way it acts, efforts to intervene by force may well backfire and may even make the situation worse as is appears to be proving the case in Iraq. Trying to understand the way the latter regime worked does not, in any way, represent an apology for Saddam Hussein's horrific crimes, use of torture and chemical weapons, but it does mean that Washington needed to fully comprehend the complex nature of that regime, its history and its strategy in regard to the region, and why it acted the way it acted in regard to the war with Iran and its invasion of Kuwait–before trying to modify the regime's behavior.
The option of long-term containment - which would not have ruled out the possibility of another coup attempt - was dismissed. (The Clinton administration had attempted at least two coup d'états. Both, unfortunately, failed.) The Franco-German-Russian proposal for more muscular weapons inspections, which would have put an international force on the ground within Iraq, was likewise ruled out. Purported back-channel pleas by Saddam Hussein to arrange a political settlement which would have included Iraqi cooperation in fighting terrorism, full support for any US plan in the Arab-Israeli peace process, as well as "free elections" after two years, were dismissed as hoax. Evidently, the US believed that Saddam would continue to play cat and mouse, and thus it refused to trust any promises.
Franco-German warnings of even greater chaos, including a potential destabilization of the entire region, if the US did intervene unilaterally, went totally unheeded. Yet once the US decided to intervene, in the belief that no other options were really feasible, then Washington really needed to go all the way, to supply sufficient military and police forces - to guarantee stability, to protect lives and archeological treasures, and not just oil facilities. Instead, the Bush administration, cheered on by jingoist neo-conservatives, deluded itself into believing that all factions of Iraqi society would welcome the Americans and Brits as "liberators." Then, in taking cost-cutting half measures, post-war "planning" was largely non-existent; the consequences have been an unmitigated disaster.
There is a further danger in the very way in which the US and its allies fight the wars on "terrorism" and on "rogue states." In the heat of the battle, it is possible that we may increasingly act more and more like "them" (the "terrorists"). Abu Ghurayb prisoner abuse shocked world opinion in its overt efforts to humiliate those taken prisoner, by using means that dishonored and degraded the values held in esteem by Arab/Islamic culture. Such actions revealed the hypocritical pretense of taking the "high moral road" that American neo-conservatives had proclaimed as a political-ethical justification for preclusive intervention in Iraq. Along with the US inability to sustain a modicum of domestic stability in post-war Iraq, such outrageous behavior by low-level military personnel (tolerated, if not instigated, by the some of the highest echelons of command) has seriously undermined the credibility of American "leadership" in general, all the more so in the eyes of those for which the Americans have claimed to be fighting.
One wonders if Tony Blair had at least forewarned George Bush, Jr. of the British experience in Iraq in 1917-33. In 1920, it took more than one year for the British to repress the Sunni, Shi'ite and Kurdish uprisings, which largely took place in the countryside and not in the major urban centers as is the case today. It then took more than a decade to grant Iraq a semblance of sovereignty. The British were able to rule through an essentially Sunni elite and a constitutional monarch, King Faysal. The British were additionally impelled to use force in the effort to integrate a very artificial state formed in the aftermath of Ottoman collapse that was made up of conflicting ethnic and religious factions - the key geohistorical factor that eventually set the stage for the horrific violence that characterized the regime of Saddam Hussein.
Today's situation may prove even more difficult and dangerous for the Americans. Unlike the British, Washington has instead promised to establish a new form of "democratic federalism" which threatens to degenerate into "communitarian chaos" based upon tribal, ethnic, religious power brokers, as opposed to more secular political criteria. It also possible that the US may, like the British, find it necessary to rule behind a tough authoritarian leadership, which, hopefully, will not prove to be as brutal as that of Saddam Hussein, although risks of "collateral damage" will continue to haunt all forms of military action against insurgency.
Having now largely alienated significant factions of both Sunnis and Shi'ites, the US has not entirely satisfied various Kurdish factions who seek greater autonomy, not to overlook inadvertently opening the door to renewed Turkish conflict with the Kurdish PKK, in which Turkey has threatened to intervene in Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. The US has to deal with both Al-Qaida and Iranian infiltration into Iraq as well. In this regard, the US is stuck in quicksand in which it will prove very difficult to extricate itself... It is highly probable that the US and its allies (or an increasingly internationalized force) will remain in Iraq for the very long term (over a decade). If not, the country will most likely slip into civil war - in the process of disaggregation.
Washington, by itself, did not "cause" the new global disorder, yet the roots of the present crisis to a large extent lie in the general failure of US diplomacy to establish new and more concerted norms for international state behavior in the post-Cold War era, and to point the way toward a more peaceful world, with a modicum of order and justice.
It is now time for us to point the way... that is, if it is not already too late.
